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Abstract   
 
This paper, by drawing upon accountability theories, aims to explore and examine practices related to 
discharging economic and legal accountability in Malaysian unit trust industry. The evidence was primarily 
constructed from two main sources, documentary review and in-depth interviews. Document review was 
undertaken on various documents issued by the industry regulators and industry players. Meanwhile, semi-
structured interviews were carried out with representative from the regulators, unit trust management companies 
(UTMCs), a unit trust distributor company, and unit trust advisors. Evidence suggests that economic and legal 
accountability, which are commonly exercised as a form of external oversight and control, has been dominated 
the industry, for example, via the issuance and enforcement of various rules, acts, regulations, and guidelines 
over the industry players. While economic and legal accountability, which typically prioritized a limited range 
of influential stakeholders, are important and crucial for investors’ protection and in developing a sound unit 
trust industry, too much emphasis, may cause other stakeholders affected – directly or indirectly- by UTMCs 
activities left unconsidered or received inadequate attention. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Accountability has been argued as already situated in organizational life (Munro and Mouritsen, 1996; Mulgan, 
2000). It has been regarded as an ethical practice that involves a moral principle (Stewart, 1995 as cited in 
Miller, 2002; Mulgan, 2000). McKernan and MacLullich (2004, p.327) claim that it is not possible to expect 
accounting regulations and norms, rules or principles to be effective while they lack moral authority and force. 
As the ultimate aim of accountability is to measure up to the demands of the other, this ethical requirement 
should guide the reconstruction of formal systems of accounting (Messner, 2009, p.922). Meaningful 
accountability, which addressing the exclusion and discrimination of certain group(s) of party e.g. less 
influential stakeholder, has been argued to be able to shift power imbalance (Shahrokh and Lopez-Franco, 
2015). One (general/basic) conception of accountability is as the duty to provide an account (by no means 
necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible that involves two 
responsibilities or duties: (1) to undertake certain actions (or forbear from taking action) and (2) to provide an 
account of those actions (Gray et al., 1996).  
 
One broad conception of accountability comes from mainstream accountability literature. Mainstream literature 
conceives accountability as representation and control (Nelson, 1993). This is particularly obvious from 
Mulgan’s (2000) argument who contends that in its core sense accountability is about being held accountable by 
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external authority.  From this perspective, accountability is represented by economic, legal, hierarchical, 
functional form of accountability that is claimed as a form of accountability which dominate market sectors, 
public sector, and NGO/third sector (see, for example, Gray,Owen & Adam 1996, Pallot, 1991, Ebrahim, 2003, 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). On the other hand, various broader conceptions of accountability which include 
for example, social accountability  (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007) and downward accountability (Dixon et al., 
2006, Christensen and Ebrahim, 2006) have been identified and/or proposed that address the accountability 
needs of much wider organization’s (accountor) stakeholders including  social and environmental impacts (Gray 
et al., 1996).  
 
Malaysian unit trust industry, with tight and close monitoring by the regulators, has been argued as one of the 
most regulated sectors that emphasis the practice of discharging economic and legal accountability. While these 
forms of accountability are important for the industry and the investors, too much emphasis on economic and 
legal accountability, for example, may lead to what Roberts (1991, 1996) argues as encouraging an 
individualizing character. In addition, reporting and disclosure, as the vital mechanism of these forms of 
accountability, do only “account for” organization activities that fall under the umbrella of economic activity 
which normally can be quantified or measured in financial terms and are normally prepared for limited range of 
powerful stakeholders (Lehman, 1999).  Few empirical studies, however, have been conducted to examine the 
practice of these forms of accountability. This study by employing particularly Chilsom’s (1995) and Gray et 
al.’s (1996) conception of economic and legal accountability, therefore, aims to explore and examine practices 
related to discharging economic and legal accountability in Malaysian unit trust industry. Further discussion on 
the conception of economic and legal accountability is undertaken in the following section.  
 
2. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
At what can be argued as its narrowest or basic form, economic accountability (Roberts, 2003) has been 
understood as financially focused accountability which typically requires a formal explanation (Dixon et al., 
2006) to limited, powerful stakeholders. Economic accountability concerns with the efficient use of scarce 
resources (Raffer, 2004), decision making and control (Jones, 1999). This form of accountability which to a 
larger extent draws upon the “principal-agent” model (Dixon et al., 2006) is commonly exercised as a form of 
external oversight and control as an important part of mandatory (Dixon et al., 2006), external regulatory 
approaches to accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). As it stems from contract-based relationships (Raffer, 2004) 
financial/economic accountability typically comes with one party or the principal, with the ability or power to 
impose sanctions or seek for remedies (Raffer, 2004) from the other party or the agents.   
 
Financial or economic accountability is also understood as financially focused accountability which typically 
requires a formal explanation (Dixon et al., 2006) to limited and influential stakeholders particularly to 
shareholders (Gray et al., 1996), donors (Dixon et al., 2006), other financial providers and government (e.g. 
regulators) (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). In addition, it emphasizes on accounts disclosed to external 
shareholders and the public in various forms such as profit and loss statements, earnings announcements, or 
press statement by the CEO (Messner, 2009) or corporate accountability reports (Christensen, 2016). The 
exchange of accounts which takes place within the organization or between the organization and some of its 
contractual stakeholders (e.g. shareholders or suppliers) often by means of reporting and control routines in 
which costs, profits, returns or other management-related information is communicated (Messner, 2009, p.920).  
Here the organization  is required to provide an account for its decision-making outcomes and the procedures 
and means used to derive those outcomes (Haigh, 2006). Therefore, it might also be appropriate to refer 
economic/financial accountability as public accountability since the important characteristic of these accounts is 
the fact that their ‘target’/ ‘recipients’ are located outside the organization (Messner, 2009, p.920). The 
fulfilment of this accountability requirements has been described as meeting the minimum level of legal 
accountability (Tinker et al., 1991).  
 
Meanwhile, Chisolm (1995, p.141) defines legal accountability as “either an obligation to meet prescribed 
standards of behaviour or an obligation to disclose information about one’s actions even in the absence of a 
prescribed standard.” Legal accountability focuses on deterrence and punitive measures which are regarded as a 
highly constrained approach that fails to take into account of organizational behaviour. These are not enshrined 
in law as well as it focuses on external regulation for ensuring accountability, with little regard for internal and 
less formalized organizational norms or expectations (Ebrahim, 2003, p.195). The law lays down the minimum 
level of responsibilities and rights, thus the minimum level of legal accountability (Tinker, Lehman, & Neimark, 
1991). It has also been argued that tight and detailed regulations imposed by the regulators acts as constraints or 
restrictions (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). 
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However, too much emphasis on economic and legal accountability, may lead to what Roberts (1991, 1996) 
argues as encouraging an individualizing character, “since they promote a sense of the self that is preoccupied 
with achieving certain norms and standards and... induce the self to relate to others through the lens of these 
categories alone” (Messner, 2009, p.922). In addition, economic and legal accountability mechanisms, for 
example, reporting and disclosure, do only “account for” organization activities that fall under the umbrella of 
economic activity which normally can be quantified or measured in financial terms. Furthermore, the accounts 
are normally prepared for limited range of powerful stakeholders which is mainly for decision making purposes 
(Lehman, 1999).  
 
As an alternative, a broader forms of accountability have been proposed which include, but not limited to, social 
accountability (O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007), downward accountability (Dixon et al., 2006, Christensen and 
Ebrahim, 2006), holistic accountability (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008), and communitarian accountability 
(Pallot, 1991). In general, broader forms of accountability should address the accountability needs of much 
wider organization’s (accountor) stakeholders which concern with not only economic issue but also social and 
environmental impacts that an organization cause or might cause through its activities. It is said or intended to 
create more fair and just society through i.e. distribution of more information to the society (Gray et al., 1996). 
It is a form of accountability that sees “the self in ways that enact and reinforce a sense of the interdependence 
of self and other; an interdependence that includes both an instrumental and a moral dimension” (Roberts, 2001, 
p.1551). It is not only about satisfying external, regulatory accountability but it is about the responsibility 
discharging a broader form of accountability that is driven by felt responsibility (Fry, 1995). In contrast with the 
view of agency theorist who consider accountability as a constraint upon an essential, opportunistic and self-
interested human nature (Roberts, 2001) where the accountable-self is always preoccupied with a concern of 
how the self are measured or assessed (seen) (Roberts, 1991), accountability here, through the creation of self-
knowledge and the embrace of failure (Roberts, 1991), is seen as an opportunity for learning and sharing 
(O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
 
3. METHODS 
 
The evidence was primarily constructed from two main sources, documentary review and semi structured 
interviews. A thorough analysis was carried out on various documents such as unit trust industry guidelines, 
standards, code and by –laws issued by SC Malaysia and Federation of Investment Managers Malaysia (FIMM), 
the self-regulatory body of the industry. Various documents issued by four UTMCs, which agreed to participate 
in the study, such as annual reports and fund prospectuses were also thoroughly reviewed. The documents had 
been content analysed by employing a thematic analysis (Krippendorff, 2004), which involves a theme or 
combination of several categories. The coding unit consists of words, sentences, paragraphs, section or even a 
whole document (e.g. a newspaper article) by taking into account the context unit which is normally larger than 
the coding unit as a means to assist the researcher to understand the coding unit. Evidence from documentation 
review was corroborated with data from semi-structured interviews. 
 
Before the actual interview session is conducted, a pilot interview was carried out with a unit trust advisor which 
lasted approximately forty five minutes. This was done in order to test the clarity of the questions as well as to 
see whether the questions are appropriate for the main study. Based on the pilot interview, several interview 
questions were refined to make them easier to understand during the main interviews sessions. Data from the 
pilot interview was analysed manually to identify additional themes or issues that were overlook for the actual 
interview session. 
 
Twenty one interviews were conducted with the representative(s) from the four UTMCs, FIMM, the SC 
Malaysia, one unit trust distributor company, and five individual unit trust advisors. The first semi-structured 
interviews were completed in the period of July to September 2010 followed by a second round of interviews 
conducted in April to June 2011 to clarify issues or views from the first interview sessions. Between these two 
rounds of interviews several phone calls were made and emails were used to follow up any issues that needed 
further clarification and explanation. Each interview, except with one of the regulatory officers, was recorded 
and lasted between forty five minutes to one and a half hour. The interviews were conducted in English. The 
transcripts and documents were analysed with Nvivo8 software supplemented by manual coding to identify 
patterns, deep insights and irregularities of evidence gathered from the transcriptions, field notes, and documents 
reviewed (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). The initial themes identified were then compared and grouped under 
broader overarching themes (Bazeley, 2007) which were summarised into a synthesis of the main findings 
which made extensive use of direct quotations from the transcripts (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). The 
empirical findings and detailed analysis are provided in the following section. 
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4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Generally, the practice and emphasize of economic and legal accountability in Malaysian unit trust industry can 
be observed through, for example, the issuance and enforcement of various acts, guidelines, standards, code and 
by –laws by the industry regulators. The following sub-sections discuss how, particularly Chilsom’s (1995) and 
Gray et al.’s (1996), conception of economic and/or legal accountability translated into practices in Malaysian 
unit trust industry. 
 
4.1  Obligation to Meet Prescribed Standards of Behaviour 
 
The requirement for the Malaysian unit trust industry players to meet prescribed standards of behavior can be 
observed through, the issuance and enforcement of various acts, guidelines, standards, code issued by SC 
Malaysia and FIMM, the self-regulatory body of the industry, as can be seen in table 1 and table 2. All of these 
requirements are compulsory to be met by the industry players in conducting their business operations. It is also 
necessary for the industry players to comply with the FIMM’s Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional 
Conduct, which sets out the general principles and minimum standards of good practice, in carrying out their 
business activities (Tinker et al., 1991). These acts, guidelines as well as standards, prescribe the minimum 
behaviour (i.e. business operations and activities) expected from the industry players and the minimum 
information required to be reported and disclosed by the industry players as the law lays down the minimum 
level of responsibilities and rights, thus the minimum level (Tinker et al., 1991) of economic and legal 
accountability. This practice indirectly reflects the emphasis given by the regulators of the industry over 
economic and legal accountability (Ebrahim, 2003) that is defined by Chisolm (1995, p.14) as “...either an 
obligation to meet prescribed standards of behaviour or an obligation to disclose information about one’s actions 
even in the absence of a prescribed standard”.  
 
Table 1 Acts and Guidelines issued by SC Malaysia 
No. Acts and Guidelines  
1 Capital Market & Securities Act 2007 (CMSA)  
2 Guideline on Unit Trust Funds 
3 Prospectus Guidelines for Collective Investment Schemes 
4 Guidelines on Marketing and Distribution of Unit Trust Fund  
5 Guidelines on Advertisements and Promotional Materials  
6 Guidelines on Online Transactions and Activities in relation to Unit Trusts 
 
Table 2 Standards, Code, By-Laws and Guidelines issued by FIMM 
No.  Standards, Code, By-Laws and Guidelines 
1 Investment Management Standards (IMS)- 9 IMSs 
2 Code of Ethics and Standards of Professional Conduct  
3 FIMM’s Consolidated Rules (9 Chapters) 
 
Furthermore, there is an explicit and clear expectation or requirement of the regulators’ over unit trust industry 
players to ‘act’ or ‘behave’ according to or in compliance with the legislations such as the Guidelines on Unit 
Trust Funds, Guidelines on Marketing and Distribution of Unit Trust Fund as well as the Code of Ethics and 
Standards of Professional Conduct for the Unit Trust Industry. This requirement is clearly stated in the 
Guidelines on Unit Trust Funds which mentions that “All parties to a unit trust fund are expected to be guided 
by the letter and spirit of the regulatory requirements” (Securities Commission Malaysia, 2009, p.1-1). As an 
example, one of the expected business operations (action) that needs to be undertaken by the UTMC (Chilsom, 
1995; Gray et al., 1996) before commencing marketing and selling activities of unit trusts is to prepare and 
register a fund’s prospectus with SC Malaysia. Detailed provisions and guidelines guide the processes of 
issuances, registration, and amendments of a fund’s prospectus. With the issuance and registration of the 
prospectus, UTMC is regarded as have fulfilled (partially) it’s economic and legal responsibility as well as 
discharged (partially) its economic and legal accountability to the potential unit holders and the government (the 
regulator) (Chilsom, 1995; Gray et al., 1996).  
 
4.2  Obligation to Disclose Information about One’s Actions 
 
The duty to provide or disclose (minimum) information is one means to account about the industry player’s 
actions (Chilsom, 1995; Gray et al., 1996). In the context of the unit trust industry, duty to provide formal 
(financial) account (Dixon et al., 2006; Messner, 2009) is undertaken through the fund’s annual and interim 
report that are distributed to the unit holders. These reports are considered as the vital UTMCs’ accountability 
reports (Christensen, 2016) to particularly its fund holders. UTMCs have to lodge these reports to SC Malaysia 
within two months after the end of the financial period. Through the preparation and distribution of these 
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reports, a UTMC is considered discharged of its economic and legal accountability upwardly to unit holders and 
to the government (the regulators) (Chilsom, 1995; Gray et al., 1996 O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). 
 
In addition to reporting to investors or unit holders, under Chapter 13 of the Guidelines on Unit Trust Funds 
UTMCs are required to report to SC Malaysia. On a monthly basis, all UTMCs are required to submit a UTF 
Return via the Trust and Investment Management Electronic Reporting System (TIM-ERS). Through the 
preparation and submission of this report a UTMC is considered as having fulfilled its legal responsibility and 
discharged its economic accountability upwardly to the government (the regulators) (Chilsom, 1995; Gray et al., 
1996; O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008). On the other hand, this monthly reporting requirement to SC Malaysia, 
mirrors what has been the concern over accountability as a form of external oversight and control (Ebrahim, 
2003) where it encourages rationalizations of action (O'Dwyer and Unerman, 2008) which involves “the 
constant giving and demanding of reasons for [and results of] conduct” (Roberts, 2001, p.1549).    
 
In general, these (legal/mandatory) reporting and disclosure requirements reflect the emphasis given to 
economic and legal accountability which are commonly exercised as a form of external oversight and control as 
an important part of mandatory (Dixon et al., 2006), external regulatory approaches to accountability (Ebrahim, 
2003). The evidence presented here, to a certain degree, seems to provide support to a claim made by some 
interviewees who argued that the Malaysian unit trust industry is highly regulated and monitored. This was 
expressed by an interviewee: 
 
 “As at now, unit trust companies are highly regulated. They are (the industry) highly regulated” (Compliance 
Officer, R12).  
 
While the practices of economic and legal forms of accountability are important and crucial for investors’ 
protection and in developing a sound capital market, some interviewees argued that the tight and detailed 
regulations imposed by the regulator as constraints or restrictions (Roberts and Scapens, 1985). This is as 
expressed in the following statement: 
 
“What I was mentioning is more on what is the, what is the issue of our survival with all of these restrictions. 
On accountability, yes, we are still accountable to all those things right, for everybody that actually looks into 
us. Be it the SC, be it the FIMM, be it the EPF, be it the investors, we have to address whatever issues that they 
come back to us. So we are still accountable to all our, our, how we manage their funds. It wouldn’t be any 
different on that. In fact, as time progress possibly there is more that we have to disclose right to the investors. 
On the investors it will be good because more information gets to them. On us it will be tough. Because you 
have to run the business, you have to do the reporting, you know”. (Compliance Officer, R12). 
 
On the other hand, beside reports and documents such as fund reports and prospectuses that are required by the 
regulators to be issued, all except one UTMC do not publish any social and environmental reports. The content, 
for example of both the fund reports and prospectuses is limited to information, particularly financial 
information, required or mandated by the relevant legislation or guidelines. The absence of accounts on aspects 
beyond economic matters that might, for example, assist the stakeholders to be critically aware of any impacts 
the UTMCs activities might have on social and environmental issues (Sawandi, 2016, p.52) to some extent 
indicates the emphasize given by the industry in discharging economic and legal accountability over other forms 
of accountability. This also indicates that the industry prioritizes a limited range of financially influential 
stakeholders such as the unitholders and the regulators over the less powerful, influential stakeholders such as 
the general public in discharging accountability. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Evidence suggests that economic and legal accountability, which are commonly exercised as a form of external 
oversight and control, are the main forms of accountability discharged or emphasized in Malaysian unit trust 
industry. This is evident via, for example, the issuance and enforcement of various rules, acts, regulations, and 
guidelines as well as close and tight monitoring by the industry regulators over the industry players. While 
economic and legal forms of accountability are important and crucial for investors’ protection and in developing 
a sound unit trust industry, too much emphasis, as can be observed in Malaysian unit trust industry, may lead to 
what Roberts (1991, 1996) argues as encouraging an individualizing character. In addition, as the main 
economic and legal accountability mechanisms, for example, reporting and disclosure, do only “account for” 
UTMCs activities and/or performance that fall under the umbrella of economic activity which normally can be 
quantified or measured in financial terms, activities and/or performance that cannot or difficult to be quantified 
or measured in financial terms such as social and environmental aspects may be put aside or ignored by the 
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UTMCs. Hence, it is vital for relevant parties in the industry to encourage and to not overlook the importance of 
discharging other forms of accountability, e.g. social accountability, to each group of stakeholders in the 
industry. 
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